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John R. Becker-Blease (USA), Fred R. Kaen (USA), Ahmad Etebari (USA), Hans Baumann (USA) 
Employees, firm size and profitability in U.S. manufacturing 
industries 
Abstract 
We examine the relation between firm size and profitability within 109 SIC four-digit manufacturing industries. De-
pending on our measure of profitability, we find that profitability increases at a decreasing rate and eventually declines 
in up to 47 of our industries. No relation between profitability and size is found in up to 52 of our industries. These two 
categories account for 97 of our 109 industries. Profitability continues to increase as firms become larger in up to 11 
industries. Hence, the relation between size and profitability is industry specific. But, regardless of the shape of the size 
profitability function, we find that profitability is negatively correlated with the number of employees for firms of a 
given size measured in terms of total assets and sales.  
These results are puzzling in the context of work by others who report that common stock returns are negatively corre-
lated with size when size is measured by the market value of a company or with the work of those who argue that size 
is a proxy for risk. Interpreted against these works, our findings may mean that large firms earn excess returns, that 
small firms fail to earn their cost of capital, or that accounting returns simply behave differently than market returns 
with respect to firm size. 
Keywords: profitability, size, financial statement analysis. 
JEL Classification: G30. 
 
Introduction© 
Does a connection exist between the size of a firm 
and its profitability? According to theories of firm 
size based on economies of scale, the answer is yes. 
However, other theories of the firm make different 
predictions – including a prediction that no relation 
exists between size and profitability. But, what is 
the evidence?  
Much of the existing empirical work that examines 
the relation between size and profitability was moti-
vated by questions about whether size led to market 
power and economic rents and whether firms in 
highly concentrated industries were more profitable 
than those in less concentrated industries, the assump-
tion being that concentration reduced competition and 
increased profitability. The immediate empirical ques-
tion investigated was whether intra-industry differ-
ences in profitability existed and, if so, whether they 
were related to industry concentration. A byproduct of 
testing these hypotheses was indirect information 
about the relation between firm size and accounting 
measures of profitability. 
The accumulated evidence is mixed. Representative 
early studies include Hall and Weiss (1967) who 
reported that size did tend to be associated with 
higher profit rates among the Fortune 500 compa-
nies for the years 1956 through 1962. Stekler (1963) 
and Osborn (1970), however, reached the opposite 
conclusion.  
Later, Schmalensee (1989), using IRS Statistics of 
Income: Corporations data for 1953 through 1983 at 
the two-digit SIC level in a study seeking to deter-
mine whether systematic changes in intra-industry 
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profitability occurred over time, found that large 
firms were more profitable than small firms within 
the same industry. Schmalensee, as the others did, 
defined size in terms of total assets and used a num-
ber of accounting profitability measures including 
profit margin and return on assets. But, earlier work 
by Schmalensee (1987) at the four-digit SIC level 
found that firm size and profitability were not 
strongly correlated within these narrower industry 
definitions. So, Schmalensee’s results are sensitive 
to SIC classification choices. 
As we noted, these early studies sought to inform 
the industry structure-conduct-performance debate 
and not what determines (explains) firm size per se. 
As interest in the structure-conduct-performance 
debate waned, though, interest in why firms existed 
and the determinants of firm size itself waxed with a 
variety of theories emerging. Kumar, Rajan and 
Zingales (2001) classify these theories into three 
categories: technological, organizational and institu-
tional. They have different implications for the rela-
tion between firm size and profitability through 
what they say about the determinants of an optimal 
size firm and/or constraints on firm growth. 
We describe these theories in Section 1. Here we 
note that given the existing theories, no a priori 
reason exists to assume that large firms are inher-
ently more profitable than small firms. In fact, 
Dhawan (2001), who examines the relation between 
firm size and productivity for U.S. firms between 
1970 and 1989 at highly aggregated levels of ser-
vices and manufacturing actually finds the opposite 
situation to be the case. Using Compustat data, 
Dhawan finds that profitability measured as operat-
ing income to total assets is negatively related to 
firm asset size.  
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We examine the relation between firm size and prof-
itability within 109 SIC four-digit manufacturing 
industries between 1987, when extended data be-
came available on Compustat, and 2002. Depending 
on our measure of profitability, we find that profit-
ability increases at a decreasing rate and eventually 
declines in up to 47 of our industries. No relation 
between profitability and size is found in up to 52 of 
our industries. These two categories account for 97 
of our 109 industries. Profitability continues to in-
crease as firms become larger in up to 11 industries. 
Hence, the relation between size and profitability is 
industry specific. But, regardless of the shape of the 
size profitability function, we find that profitability is 
negatively correlated with the number of employees 
for firms of a given size measured in terms of total 
assets and sales.  
These results are puzzling in the context of work by 
others who report that common stock returns are nega-
tively correlated with size when size is measured by 
the market value of a company or with the work of 
those who argue that size is a proxy for risk (e.g., 
Banz, 1981; Fama and French, 1992). Interpreted 
against these stylized facts and hypotheses, our find-
ings may mean that large firms earn excess returns or 
that small firms fail to earn their cost of capital.  
We describe our research method and the data we 
used for our statistical analyses in Section 2. Our sta-
tistical findings are reported in Section 3. Section 4 
explores connections between profitability functions 
and capital intensity, industry concentration ratios, 
market-to-book ratios and firm diversification. The 
final Section contains our analysis and conclusions. 
1. Theories of the firm 
Theories of the firm can be classified as technologi-
cal, organizational and institutional depending on 
whether they emphasize the production technology 
used by the firm, the firm’s organizational archi-
tecture and relations among stakeholders or the 
legal and political environment where the firm 
operates. The theories often contain implicit as-
sumptions about the relation between size and profit-
ability, especially those theories that suggest the exis-
tence of an “optimal size” firm or limits to firm size 
due to diseconomies of scale or market size.  
We briefly review these theories with respect to 
what they predict, if anything, about the relation be-
tween size and profitability. Our review follows the 
structure used by Kumar, Rajan and Zingales (2001). 
1.1. Technological theories. Technological theories 
emphasize physical capital and economies of scale 
and scope as factors that determine optimal firm size 
and, by implication, profitability. These theories 
focus on the production process and the investment 
in physical capital necessary to produce output. 
Increasing economies of scale that permit lumpy 
fixed costs to be spread over large output volumes, 
thereby, decreasing the average cost of production 
and increasing the return on capital invested, are 
associated with increases in firm size. If no limit 
exists to economies of scale, the unregulated out-
come would be one firm and a natural monopoly. 
However, if economies of scale cease to exist, at 
that point bigger is no longer better, at least in 
terms of lowering production costs and improving 
efficiency.  
The relation between size and profitability due to 
economies of scale is depicted in Figure 1. Whether 
efficiency and profitability eventually fall (average 
costs increase) as firms expand under a purely techno-
logical story is unclear. One can assert that they do due 
to diseconomies of scale; but, the question then arises 
as to what causes these diseconomies. Organizational 
theories enter the picture here. 
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Fig. 1. Predicted relation between profitability and size 
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1.2. Organizational theories. Organizational theo-
ries have size affecting profitability through organ-
izational transaction costs (Williamson, 1985), 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and 
span of control costs. We also include under or-
ganizational theories critical resource (Grossman 
and Hart, 1986 and Rajan and Zingales, 2001) and 
competency (Foss, 1993 and Niman, 2002) theo-
ries of the firm. 
Transaction costs are the costs of planning, adapting 
and monitoring task completion and performance in 
an organization. These costs include drafting and 
negotiating agreements as well as the costs of deal-
ing with disputes and handling unintended out-
comes.  
Agency costs arise out of conflicts of interest among 
the stakeholders of the firm due to information 
asymmetries and self-seeking behavior. The un-
derlying assumption for publicly owned firms is 
that managers and employees will seek to grow 
the firm even if it means making investments that 
do not cover their cost of capital because manage-
rial and employee salaries, employment opportu-
nities, perks and employment security are related 
to firm size. 
Management can grow the firm by expanding its 
existing operations or through diversification and 
conglomeration. Both growth strategies may destroy 
shareholder wealth and some evidence exists that 
firms that pursue a diversification strategy sell at a 
discount to focused firms or that diversification 
strategies destroy shareholder value (Lamont and 
Polk, 2002).  
Growing the firm is also equated with increasing 
layers of management and administrative staff 
which reduces the ability of the company to quickly 
respond to changing competitive conditions and to 
“log-rolling” within the firm’s bureaucracy with 
regard more to a function of politicking than of per-
formance.  
Other things being equal, the greater the span of 
control (number of administrative layers) in an or-
ganization, the greater the transaction and agency 
costs will be. A common proxy for the number of 
administrative layers is the number of employees. 
So, organizational theories of the firm based on 
transactions and agency costs and span of control 
costs predict that at some point average per unit 
transaction and agency costs would increase and 
offset economies of scale and scope, thus, establish-
ing an optimal size for the firm in terms of profit-
ability.  
Critical resource theories of the firm emphasize the 
control that an entrepreneur or owner has over those 
resources – assets, technology, intellectual property 
– as determinants of firm size. Kumar, Rajan and 
Zingales (2001) find that as legal institutions and 
laws improve the protection afforded the owner of 
the company over these critical resources, the size 
of the firm increases. Rajan and Zingales (2002) go 
on to construct a model that ties firm size to the 
ability of the entrepreneur to maintain control over 
the intangible factors that make the firm profitable. 
The greater the importance of these intangible fac-
tors (relative to, say, fixed assets such as machin-
ery), the less likely the firm is to grow (become 
larger). So, critical resource theories also tie firm 
size and profitability together in such a way that at 
some point, increased size leads to lower profits. 
However, under a critical resource theory of the 
firm “small” firms need not necessarily be less prof-
itable than “large” firms within a given institutional 
environment.  
Competency theories of the firm posit that the firm 
is a collection of competencies that allow it to earn 
more than its opportunity cost of capital (surplus, 
economic rents, positive net present value projects). 
These competencies can include superior production 
technologies, superior marketing skills and superior 
research and development skills. The important 
point is that one or more of these competencies 
permit the firm to remain competitive and earn more 
than an adequate return. But, in order for the firm to 
protect its position, it must make sure other compa-
nies do not acquire its superior competencies – also 
called secrets. 
At this point, competency theories join critical re-
source theories. Think of competencies as the criti-
cal resources. One way to control the dissemination 
of secrets is to share them with as few people as 
possible and this implies restricting the size of the 
firm where size is defined in terms of employees. 
Consequently, this need to protect the secrets of the 
firm places a limit on its size.  
Competency theories, however, do not assume that 
small firms are more or less profitable than large 
firms (or less than the size where secrets are dis-
closed). One of the appealing attributes of compe-
tency theory is that a “small” firm can be just as 
profitable as a “large” firm in a given industry be-
cause the firms have different competencies that let 
them both earn surplus returns. As described by 
Niman (2003), “Survival depends not on being bet-
ter, but rather on being sufficiently different [due to 
different competencies] so that the advantages of 
others do not prove fatal”. In fact, a “small” firm 
may be more profitable than a “large” firm within 
its product niche due to its unique competencies. 
The reason the “small” firm does not grow is attrib-
uted to a “small” market for its product or services 
and/or to the loss of its secrets. 
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1.3. Institutional theories. Institutional theories tie 
firm size to such factors as legal systems, anti-trust 
regulation, patent protection, market size and the 
development of financial markets. Kumar, Rajan 
and Zingales (2001) report, for example, that capi-
tal-intensive firms are larger in countries with effi-
cient judicial systems and that R&D intensive indus-
tries have larger firms in countries with stronger 
patent protection. 
We have restricted our investigation to firms incor-
porated in the U.S. So, to some extent, we have 
controlled for many institutional factors. However, 
to the extent that some manufacturing industries 
may be more concentrated than others or subject to 
different regulations within the U.S., institutional 
and market structure factors may continue to affect 
observed relations between size and profitability. 
1.4. Theory implications for firm size and profit-
ability. The basic implication of combining techno-
logical and organizational theories emphasizing 
transaction and agency costs of firm size is that 
within a specific industry (common production 
technology) and within a common institutional envi-
ronment, firm size and profitability may be linked 
through a trade-off of economies of scale, transac-
tions costs and agency costs. Essentially, the story is 
the following:  
Through some initial range, economies of scale lead 
to lower average unit costs. The benefits from these 
lower costs can be distributed among all the stake-
holders of the firm or, through competitive pres-
sures, lead to lower product prices. Let’s take the 
case of competitive markets where the cost savings 
are passed on to the company’s customers in the 
form of lower prices. The firm with the lowest unit 
production costs can charge the lowest prices. If unit 
costs are a decreasing function of size and the prod-
ucts of small firms are identical to that of large 
firms, then small firms will have to charge the same 
(or a lower) price as large firms resulting in lower 
per unit profits and a lower return on investment. 
Alternatively, at that point where economies of 
scale no longer exist, average unit costs would be 
unrelated to firm size. Then, one might observe, 
for example, medium and large firms being 
equally profitable, as depicted in Figure 1 where 
the graph for the line labeled economies of scales 
becomes level. 
However, firms also face transaction, agency, and 
span of control costs (organizational costs), which, 
other things being equal, increase with firm size. 
Thus, at some point, organizational costs will over-
whelm the benefits of economies of scale and firm 
profitability will begin to decline. In Figure 1, we 
have labeled the graph that depicts these trade offs 
as the “combined economies of scale and organiza-
tional costs profit function”. The difference between 
this line and the economies of scale line is labeled 
organizational costs. At that size where economies 
of scale cease, continued growth results in ever-
higher organizational costs and higher unit costs. 
Then, overall profitability falls. In essence, these 
organization costs place limits on how large a firm 
can grow in a competitive market where the govern-
ance of the firm is organized around the objective of 
owner wealth maximization.  
Introducing critical resource and competency theo-
ries does, however, complicate this story. Both criti-
cal resource and competency theories imply a limit 
on firm size either directly so as to maintain secrets 
or indirectly through the size of the market for the 
firm’s goods and services. Competency theories, in 
particular, pose a problem because the competencies 
firms possess may be a different means of produc-
tion – the production functions of the technological 
theories. Therefore, overlaying a competency theory 
on a technological theory may or may not result in a 
prediction that size and profitability are negatively 
correlated. No relation may exist. 
Whether firms with “secret” competencies incur 
transaction or agency costs as they become larger is 
another matter. If they do, size and profitability 
are negatively correlated; if not, again, no relation 
exists. 
In summary, we are left with the following expecta-
tions about size and profitability: Either profitability 
initially increases and then levels off or it declines 
with respect to size or no relation exists between 
size and profitability. 
2. Research method and data 
In order to examine the relation between size and 
profitability, we must select proxies for size and 
profits. We also need to find a way to hold constant 
production technology and broad product classes 
where special competencies may exist across firms 
of different sizes. 
2.1. Production technology issues. We confront the 
problem of holding constant production technology 
and broad product classes by analyzing manufactur-
ing firms within the same industry where industry is 
defined by the four-digit SIC codes 2010 through 
3990. Our underlying assumption is that firms in the 
same industry will use similar, if not identical, pro-
duction technologies in a given year. Neverthe-
less, not all firms in a four-digit SIC produce 
identical products or are involved in a single line 
of business. Consequently, the less homogen?ous 
the firms in a given SIC code are, the greater the 
likelihood that our underlying assumption of simi-
lar production technologies will be violated. We 
eventually control for diversification (non-
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homogeneous firms) within an industry by includ-
ing information about the number of business 
segments reported by our firms. 
As for the competency complication: we assume 
that different competencies within an industry will 
be reflected in differences in product quality and 
performance as well as customer service and de-
pendability. Therefore, the potential for finding no 
relation between size and profitability within a four-
digit industry still exists. 
2.2. Size measurements. The size of a firm can be 
measured in a number of ways: assets, sales, em-
ployees and value added are commonly used meas-
ures. Technological theories of the firm that focus 
on economies of scale arising out of capital inputs 
would argue for using assets or sales as a measure of 
size. However, assets or sales are not especially 
good measures of size for organizational theories of 
the firm. With these theories, the primary concern is 
with how transactions, agency and span of control 
costs affect profitability – costs that are associated 
primarily with how the organization is controlled 
through a hierarchy rather than with the value and 
number of physical assets. Therefore, value added 
or number of employees rather than assets or sales 
are better measures of firm size for organizational 
theories.  
The advantage of value added is that it captures the 
complexity of an organization. Typically, complex-
ity is associated with the need for more highly 
skilled employees and greater coordination and con-
trol costs. The implication is that the span of con-
trol, contracting and monitoring costs are likely to 
be higher for more complex operations than less 
complex operations.  
The disadvantage of value added is that it is difficult 
to measure objectively. But, if most of the value 
added to a product arises from labor inputs, then the 
number of employees can also be used as a proxy 
for value added. An additional reason for using the 
number of employees is that coordination and con-
trol costs are likely to be highly correlated with both 
value added per employee and the number of em-
ployees. Finally, critical resource theories that pre-
dict entrepreneurs want to prevent secrets from leav-
ing the firms would also suggest that, in a rough 
sense, the greater the number of employees, the 
more likely secrets will “leak”. Therefore, our basic 
measure of size is the number of employees. But, 
we use the log of the number of employees in order 
to account for the fact that the median number of 
employees for firms in a given industry is consid-
erably less than the mean.  
2.3. Measuring profitability. Finding measures for 
profitability also poses problems. Traditionally, 
accounting profitability is measured by return on net 
worth (common stockholders’ equity), return on 
assets, net profit margin, net income, earnings be-
fore interest and taxes (EBIT), earnings before in-
terest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) and other related measures. We choose 
to use the following profitability measures: 
EBITDA margin, EBIT margin and EBITDA as a 
percent of total assets and EBIT to total assets. 
Both EBITDA and EBIT measure earning flows 
before interest and taxes. This attribute is extremely 
important because we can separate the effects of 
management’s financing decisions from the funda-
mental earning power of the company. For example, 
two companies may have identical EBITs but dif-
ferent net incomes and returns on net worth because 
one uses debt financing and incurs interest expense. 
We would expect the company that uses debt to 
have a higher return on net worth; but, whether this 
higher return on net worth is adequate for the in-
creased risks associated with using financial lever-
age is another matter. By using EBIT and not net 
income after taxes, we avoid this problem. 
We use EBITDA because it is a good proxy for cash 
earnings (operating cash flows). Depreciation and 
amortization are non-cash expenses. So, if one 
wants to know how much cash a company is gener-
ating – cash that can be used to pay dividends or 
reinvest in the company ? EBITDA is the preferred 
metric. A related attribute of EBITDA is that it 
mitigates the distortions to operating income caused 
by arbitrary asset depreciation schedules. 
We use EBITDA to total assets (EBITDA/TA) and 
EBIT to total assets (EBIT/TA) as our return on 
investment measures. It is possible that some firms 
in an industry may adopt a high margin, low volume 
sales strategy while others, a low margin, high vol-
ume strategy. The former would exhibit higher 
profit margins than the latter; but, both could be 
generating the same return on assets employed.  
2.4. The data. Our data come from the year 2003 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat files and are for 
four digit manufacturing SIC codes with at least 
four firms. We collect the following yearly data for 
1987 through 2002: company name, country of in-
corporation, dollar sales, dollar EBITDA, dollar 
EBIT, EBITDA margin, EBIT margin, total assets 
and number of employees. We use the data to calcu-
late EBITDA to total assets and EBIT to total assets, 
our return on investment measures of profitability. 
We then go through the following screening proc-
ess: We eliminate all companies not incorporated in 
the U.S. We eliminate any firm-year observations 
with missing data. In order to remove potential dis-
tortions associated with barely functioning compa-
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nies or with startups, we eliminate all firms that 
have sales of less than $10 million, fewer than 25 
employees or an EBIT margin of less than a nega-
tive 50 percent. We then eliminate any industry that 
has fewer than four companies in any given year so 
that we have at least one degree of freedom in terms 
of estimating a second degree polynomial. We end 
up with the 109 industries listed in Table 1. The 
total number of firm years for each industry group 
during the sample period is also included in Table 1. 
Table 1. SIC manufacturing industries  
Sample industries for which there are at least three observations in a given year between 1987 and 2002. Number of observations is 
the total number of firm-years by industry during the sample period. 
SIC Name of industry Number of 
observations
2015 Poultry, and eggs, prepared or preserved 121 
2030 Fruits, vegetables, soups, preserves, jams and jellies; and sauces 178 
2040 Grain mill products 160
2060 Sugar and confectionery products 153
2090 Miscellaneous food preparations and kindred products 168 
2200 Textile mill products 194
2211 Broad woven fabrics, cotton 143
2253 Knit Outwear Mills 98
2273 Carpets and rugs 82
2300 Apparel and related products 227
2320 Men's or boys' shirts, trousers, nightwear, underwear, & neckwear; and females and infants knit 
shirts 229
2330 Women's, girls', and infants' dresses, blouses, coats, suits, and shirts, except knit shirts 277 
2430 Millwork, plywood, and veneer 79
2451 Trailers and semi-trailers for housing or camping  124 
2510 Household furniture 158
2511 Wood household furniture, except upholstered 111 
2621 Paper mill products 247
2631 Paperboard 135
2650 Boxes of paper, of paperboard, of papier-mache, or any combinations thereof 103 
2670 Converted paper and paperboard products, except containers and boxes 270 
2711 Newspapers 279
2721 Periodicals 121
2731 Books and pamphlets 150
2750 Printed matter 270
2761 Manifold business forms 140
2810 Industrial inorganic chemicals 230
2821 Plastics materials and resins 158
2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 939
2835 Prepared diagnostic substances 272
2836 Biological products 220
2840 Soaps, detergents, and cleaning preparations, perfumes, cosmetics, and other toilet preparations 108 
2842 Specialty cleaning, polishing, and sanitation preparations 75 
2844 Toilet preparations 306
2851 Paints and allied products 136
2860 Industrial organic chemicals 185
2870 Agricultural chemicals 128
2890 Miscellaneous chemical products 198
2911 Petroleum refinery products 427
3021 Rubber and plastics footwear 96
3060 Druggist or medical supplies, (including gloves) of rubber or plastics 120 
3080 Miscellaneous plastics products 145
3081 Plastics unsupported plates, sheets and film 128 
3089 Plastics products  411
3100 Leather and leather products 85
3140 Footwear, except rubber 261
3270 Concrete, gypsum and plaster products, and lime 110 
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Table 1 (cont.). SIC manufacturing industries  
SIC Name of industry Number of 
observations
3290 Abrasive, asbestos, and miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral products 108 
3310 Blast furnace, steel works, rolling mill and finishing mill products 123 
3312 Blast furnace, steel works, and rolling mill products 469 
3317 Steel pipe and tubes 84
3350 Rolled, drawn and extruded nonferrous metal 167 
3357 Nonferrous metal wire and cable, drawn and insulated 122 
3411 Metal cans 83
3420 Cutlery, hand and edge tools, and hardware 216 
3443 Fabricated plate work 133
3452 Bolts, nuts, rivets, and washers 126
3460 Metal forgings and stampings 168
3490 Fabricated metal products 256
3523 Farm machinery and equipment, and parts 145 
3531 Construction machinery, and parts 140
3533 Oil and gas field machinery and equipment, and parts 141 
3540 Metalworking machinery and equipment, and parts 193 
3555 Printing trades machines and equipment, and parts 102 
3559 Special industry machinery, and parts 571 
3560 General industrial machinery and equipment, and parts 196 
3561 Pumps and pumping equipment, and parts  124 
3564 Fans and blowers, and parts 144
3569 General industrial machinery and equipment, and parts  179 
3571 Computers, and parts 428
3572 Computer storage devices, and parts 307 
3576 Computer terminals 622
3577 Computer peripheral equipment, and parts 602 
3578 Calculating and accounting machines, and parts 135 
3580 Refrigeration and service industry machinery, and parts 152 
3585 Refrigeration and heating equipment 199 
3590 Fluid power pumps and motors and scales and balances, except laboratory 125 
3620 Electrical industrial apparatus, and parts 160 
3621 Motors and generators, and parts 150
3634 Electric housewares and fans 117
3640 Electric lighting and wiring equipment 324 
3651 Radio and tv receiving sets, phonographs, record players, record changers, turntables, and audio 
equipment 170
3661 Telephone and telegraph apparatus, and parts 683 
3663 Radio, broadcast, and television communications equipment 747 
3669 Other communications equipment, and parts 244 
3670 Electronic components and accessories 132 
3672 Printed circuit boards 292
3674 Semiconductors and related devices, and parts 1,074 
3679 Electronic components 447
3690 Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies, and parts 239 
3711 Motor vehicles and passenger car bodies 168 
3714 Motor vehicle parts and accessories 623 
3716 Motor homes 98
3724 Aircraft engines and engine parts 131
3728 Aircraft equipment 122
3730 Yachts or pleasure boats, and parts 117 
3812 Navigation, aeronautical, search, detection, guidance, and nautical systems, instruments, and 
equipments 358
3821 Laboratory apparatus and furniture 89
3823 Indust instrument for measurement, display, control process variables  298 
3825 Instruments for measuring and testing electricity and elect signals 487 
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Table 1 (cont.). SIC manufacturing industries  
SIC Name of industry Number of 
observations
3826 Laboratory analytical instruments, and parts and accessories 246 
3827 Optical instruments, and parts 156
3829 Measuring and controlling devices, and parts 241 
3841 Surgical and medical instruments and apparatus 431 
3842 Orthopedic, prosthetic, and surgical appliances and supplies 518 
3845 Electromedical and electrotherapeutic apparatus 577 
3861 Photographic equipment and supplies 228 
3944 Games, toys, and children's vehicles, except dolls and bicycles 148 
3949 Sporting and athletic goods, and parts 255 
3990 Miscellaneous manufactured products 196 
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for our con-
solidated sample of 25,890 firm-years across all 109 
industries for the years 1987 through 2002.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for firm size and prof-
itability variables: 1987-2002 
EBIT margin is calculated as EBIT divided by total sales. 
EBITDA margin is calculated as EBITDA divided by total 
sales. TA is total assets. All data are annual data obtained from 
Compustat. The data are for firms in 109 four-digit SIC manu-
facturing industries between 1987 and 2002.  
Variable Mean Quartile1 Median
Quartile
2
Employees, 000 5,586.6 279 904 3,400 
Assets (millions) $1,317.4 $37.5 $114.4 $486.4 
Sales (millions) $1,217.6 $43.0 $136.1 $546.3 
EBIT margin 6.26% 2.43% 7.11% 11.68% 
EBITDA margin 10.42% 5.75% 10.78% 15.88% 
EBIT/TA 7.67% 2.91% 8.65% 13.93% 
EBITDA/TA 12.23% 7.16% 12.98% 18.56% 
2.5. The model. The basic model we use to estimate 
the relation between size and profitability for each 
industry is: 
? ? ? ? ,221 fff EMPLbEMPLbaP ???      (1) 
where Pf = a profit measure for firm f, EMPLf = a 
measure of employment size for firm f; and, 
EMPLf2 = the square of the measure of employ-
ment size for firm f. 
Our combined technological-organizational theory 
of the firm predicts that as the size of a firm in-
creases, profitability would increase at a decreasing 
rate and then turn negative. Here, we would expect 
to find positive coefficients on EMPL and negative 
coefficients on EMPL2. 
A positive coefficient on EMPL and a zero coeffi-
cient on EMPL2 would mean that profits were in-
creasing at a constant rate as firms grew whereas a 
zero coefficient on both EMPL and EMPL2 would 
mean that profitability was unrelated to size. Other 
possibilities include profitability constantly decreas-
ing in terms of size or decreasing at a decreasing or 
increasing rate. 
2.6. Control variables. We add yearly indicator and 
interactive variables to our basic model to control for 
industry wide macroeconomic shocks; for example, 
economy wide recessions and expansions. And, we 
use additional statistical techniques to isolate the 
unique effects of asset size and sales volume on firm 
profitability holding constant levels of employment.  
2.6.1. Year indicator variables. Our first set of control 
variables are indicator variables that permit us to iso-
late the effects of year-to-year industry-wide economic 
conditions on profits. We use an indicator variable for 
each year, Y, except 2002 making 2002 the base year 
for our analysis. With the addition of yearly indicators, 
the model becomes: 

















   (2) 
where Y1988 (1989 and so forth) takes on the value of 
1 if the profit and size data are for 1988 (1989 and 
so forth); otherwise, Y1988 takes on the value of zero. 
The coefficients on Y tell us whether the average 
profits for the industry in, say 1991, were greater or 
less than 2002, our base year. 
2.6.2. Asset and sales control variables. As we 
noted earlier, in addition to number of employees, 
total assets and sales are alternative measures of 
firm size. In fact, a very high correlation exists be-
tween the number of employees and total assets as 
well as between employees and sales and assets and 
sales. Therefore, we seek ways to isolate the effects 
of assets and sales volume on profitability; in other 
words, we seek to measure how differences in total 
assets and sales for firms with identical employment 
levels affect profitability. 
We use the following procedure. First, we estimate 
the statistical relation between total assets and firm 
size in each industry by regressing the log of total 
assets against the log of employment with the fol-
lowing equation: 
? ? ,_
,,1, yfyfyf RESTAEMPLbaTA ???    (3) 
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where TAf,y = log of total assets in millions of dollars 
for firm f in year y; EMPLf,y = log of employment 
for firm f in year y; TA_RESf,y = residual or error 
term for firm f in year y. 
The residual, TA_RESf,y, is the difference between 
the actual level of assets for firm f and what its pre-
dicted level would be based on its number of em-
ployees. We collect the total assets residuals, 
TA_RESf,y, and use them as control variables in our 
complete model as shown in Equation (5). 
A positive TA_RES means that employment under 
predicts asset levels. This outcome means that the 
firm is operating with fewer employees per dollar 
invested in assets than its competitors. But, does this 
mean the firm is likely to be more or less profitable 
than the average firm?  
Quite possibly, the explanation for the lower-than-
average employees per dollar of assets is that the 
firm has “over invested” in assets. Such “over in-
vestment” could then imply that the firm would 
have the same or lower-than-average sales per em-
ployee and, consequently, lower-than-average prof-
itability. We isolate the effects of sales on profitabil-
ity, holding constant employment and asset levels, 















   (4) 
where SALESf,y = the log of sales in millions for 
firm f in year y, EMPLf,y = log of employment for 
firm f in year y; TA_RESf,y = residual or error term 
for firm f in year y; and, S_RESf,y = the residual for 
firm f in year y in the estimating model. 
A positive value for S_RESf,y means that employ-
ment levels under predict sales volume after tak-
ing into consideration differences in asset levels 
for firms with the same number of employees and 
that sales per employee are higher than would be 
predicted given information about the number of 
employees and assets per employee. We include 
S_RESf,y in our complete model along with 
TA_RESf,y. Our complete model is: 
? ? ? ?














    (5) 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Functional forms. Table 3 contains partial 
regression results for each industry for our EBIT 
Margin profitability measure. The individual in-
dustry regressions for EBITDA Margin, 
EBITDA/TA and EBIT/TA are similar and are avail-
able from the authors. We report the coefficients 
on EMPL, EMPL2, TA_RES and SALES_RES; we 
do not report the coefficients for the yearly indica-
tor variables. Tables 4 and 5 contain summaries of 
the number of times the coefficients on EMPL, 
EMPL2, TA_RES and SALES_RES are positive or 
negative and the number of times the indicated 
profitability functional forms appeared. Our pri-
mary interest is the shape of the profitability func-
tions as reported in Table 5. 
Table 3. EBIT margin partial regression results for individual SIC industries: 1987-2002 







yyyfyfyf eRESSbRESTAbYbEMPLbEMPLbaginarMEBIT ??????? ?
?
 The dependent 
variable is EBIT Margin (EBIT/Sales). EMPL is the log employment. EMPL2 is the log of employment squared. Y is a yearly indica-
tor variable taking on the value of 1 if that year, otherwise 0. TA_RES is the residual from regressing the log of EMPL on the log of 
total assets. S_RES is the residual from regressing the log of EMPL and TA_RES on sales. 
Bold numbers indicate the coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level or lower. 





2015 -0.06641 0.003717 0.00264 -0.00472 15.72 
2030 0.01801 -6.00E-06 0.0172 0.04418 38.92
2040 0.10264 -0.00535 0.03075 0.02074 39.63
2060 0.01172 -0.00088 0.02855 -0.07361 13.66
2090 0.10426 -0.00592 0.04307 0.05302 42.46 
2200 0.01362 -0.00047 0.01277 0.01761 14.35 
2211 -0.01026 0.000547 0.02782 -0.02648 18.02 
2253 -0.05011 0.006433 0.0202 0.0658 11.79 
2273 -0.0099 0.000255 0.02949 -0.01951 1.25 
2300 0.00661 -0.00025 0.01851 -0.05485 9.27
2320 0.03198 -0.00076 0.07772 -0.00563 36.47
2330 -0.0291 0.002867 0.02918 -0.01518 12.94
2430 0.07998 -0.00304 -0.0034 -0.02986 46.41 
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Table 3 (cont.). EBIT margin partial regression results for individual SIC industries: 1987-2002 





2451 0.10254 -0.00714 0.06979 0.04631 46.41
2510 0.07296 -0.00373 0.04146 -0.04207 43.80 
2511 0.28377 -0.01777 0.03125 0.0432 20.92
2621 0.09383 -0.00524 0.01425 -0.02777 28.83 
2631 0.05718 -0.00365 0.04277 0.01503 16.30 
2650 -0.19873 0.012857 0.03732 0.00033 6.50 
2670 0.00712 0.00007 0.04658 -0.07638 31.18
2711 0.04819 -0.00208 0.02797 -0.08307 21.92
2721 0.15581 -0.0099 0.03903 -0.00572 6.19 
2731 0.00139 0.000528 0.00713 -0.05282 15.20 
2750 0.07231 -0.00389 0.03768 0.01213 12.55
2761 0.00167 0.000276 0.00046 -0.07618 20.48
2810 -0.01069 0.001264 0.03753 0.00943 20.01
2821 0.15029 -0.00909 0.05705 -0.02269 38.71 
2834 0.08355 -0.00331 0.07753 0.12129 30.36
2835 0.26619 -0.01844 0.04738 0.34751 36.29
2836 -0.09952 0.010647 0.1207 0.34192 41.11
2840 0.06668 -0.00317 -0.00906 -0.006 35.11 
2842 -0.01735 0.001918 0.01476 0.04494 69.95
2844 -0.00287 0.000911 0.03817 0.03525 7.25
2851 -0.03325 0.002293 0.05081 -0.03599 39.38 
2860 0.03044 -0.00183 0.02966 -0.02401 13.02 
2870 0.06015 -0.00175 0.03044 0.09512 33.21
2890 0.11912 -0.0067 0.02216 0.14288 40.80
2911 0.03243 -0.00147 0.02224 0.00234 24.91 
3021 0.06267 -0.00293 0.05998 -0.09976 13.73
3060 -0.00627 0.001092 -0.01035 0.02418 10.18 
3080 0.07438 -0.00434 0.00506 0.05109 8.95
3081 0.38762 -0.02602 0.04571 0.05242 51.13
3089 0.05844 -0.00331 0.04059 0.04562 13.44
3100 0.08947 -0.00569 0.00609 0.00297 7.76 
3140 0.11785 -0.00728 0.0448 -0.0149 2217 
3270 0.09574 -0.00672 0.08236 0.09583 44.90
3290 0.01413 -0.00018 0.05591 0.09686 35.33
3310 0.00817 0.000012 0.03955 -0.00725 47.26 
3312 0.10528 -0.00663 0.0146 0.07293 23.38
3317 0.3136 -0.02153 -0.02018 0.01754 0.00 
3350 0.06873 -0.00296 0.01959 0.06028 36.02
3357 0.15047 -0.00917 0.02305 0.06166 39.30
3411 0.17258 -0.0102 0.02528 -0.05127 58.35 
3420 0.11423 -0.00707 0.03007 0.01883 36.48 
3443 0.15858 -0.01117 0.07887 -0.06498 27.41
3452 0.01208 -0.00074 -0.01388 0.00964 11.57 
3460 0.04938 -0.00299 0.04777 0.00917 26.98 
3490 0.06176 -0.00323 0.06942 0.0508 21.38
3523 0.04086 -0.00155 -0.02188 0.03508 28.87
3531 -0.02117 0.001767 -0.00911 0.00071 34.83 
3533 -0.05404 0.003335 0.08322 0.05244 26.02 
3540 -0.02174 0.002447 -0.0355 -0.00097 14.06 
3555 0.00296 -0.00039 0.01977 0.03429 -0.06 
3559 -0.01351 0.002726 0.0554 0.18571 33.12
3560 0.02344 -0.00102 0.03046 -0.00853 10.58 
3561 -0.01057 0.000107 0.03727 0.02463 22.77
3564 0.08395 -0.00532 0.00609 -0.02838 9.45 
3569 0.08168 -0.0041 0.01301 -0.00144 18.65 
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Table 3 (cont.). EBIT margin partial regression results for individual SIC industries: 1987-2002 





3571 -0.0147 0.002157 0.01924 -0.00717 13.08 
3572 0.00972 0.000864 0.08808 0.03777 23.29 
3576 0.06902 -0.00334 0.08564 0.12884 30.91
3577 0.0405 -0.00096 0.03634 0.07267 9.42
3578 0.09446 -0.00522 -0.00974 0.14523 4.82
3580 0.07854 -0.00499 0.01905 0.05038 7.71
3585 0.06744 -0.00347 0.00287 0.01086 11.23 
3590 0.06082 -0.00365 0.05255 0.04911 28.20
3620 0.05404 -0.00335 0.07396 -0.00925 30.61 
3621 -0.06446 0.005613 -0.05525 0.06161 17.73 
3634 0.16331 -0.0113 0.025 -0.03128 17.02
3640 0.10377 -0.00647 0.03102 -0.03073 20.53
3651 0.12541 -0.00842 -0.0249 0.05243 -0.03 
3661 0.06587 -0.00289 0.02786 0.11769 17.54
3663 0.08586 -0.00454 0.00068 0.08632 13.72
3669 0.24622 -0.01656 -0.00301 0.04346 18.45
3670 0.10978 -0.0058 0.04034 -0.06205 23.80
3672 0.1252 -0.00712 0.01464 0.02499 21.77
3674 0.16269 -0.00955 0.03352 0.10556 22.33
3679 0.1176 -0.00733 0.01774 0.03098 10.90
3690 0.16028 -0.00978 0.05584 0.16572 23.42
3711 0.00253 0.000382 0.00594 0.0381 14.66
3714 0.07809 -0.00464 0.02164 -0.00538 11.28 
3716 0.09363 -0.00584 0.05879 0.1513 40.80
3724 -0.00722 0.000359 0.04458 -0.01169 29.06 
3728 0.02132 -0.00135 0.01855 0.07297 7.99
3730 0.14351 -0.0082 0.05289 0.08971 22.95
3812 0.0217 -0.00092 0.05073 0.11625 16.87
3821 0.07606 -0.0039 0.04166 0.10543 9.99
3823 0.07098 -0.00363 0.05877 0.10304 23.47
3825 0.10738 -0.00746 0.03146 0.10981 26.45
3826 0.05877 -0.00278 0.03323 0.2337 24.82
3827 -0.18103 0.015225 0.02069 0.21815 37.13
3829 -0.03428 0.003097 0.07156 0.18158 12.10
3841 0.14842 -0.00873 0.04216 0.03678 14.03
3842 0.12103 -0.00653 0.06012 0.06707 26.41
3845 0.0567 -0.00089 0.06151 0.18822 23.03
3861 0.03973 -0.00186 0.02378 -0.06997 12.82
3944 -0.05793 0.004965 0.00442 -0.03162 0.39 
3949 0.04576 -0.00188 0.04059 -0.01351 11.16 
3990 0.073 -0.00348 0.04561 0.01363 19.58
 
In nearly half of our industries, profitability increases 
at a decreasing rate, reaches a maximum, and then 
decreases. Depending on our profitability measure, 
from forty-one to forty-seven of our industries have 
significantly positive EMPL coefficients coupled with 
significantly negative EMPL2 coefficients.  
In forty-six to fifty-two industries, depending on the 
profitability measure, no relation exists between size 
and profitability. The coefficients on EMPL and 
EMPL2 for these industries are not significantly 
different from zero. 
What we have is a situation where accounting prof-
itability either initially increases with increases in em-
ployees or is unrelated to the number of employees. 
We interpret our results as supporting competency and 
organizational theories of the firm in combination with 
a production-function technological theory. In other 
words, small firms can be just as profitable as large 
firms due to their unique competencies. And, 
economies of scale, if they do exist, are eventually 
offset by organizational costs that lead to a reduc-
tion in profitability as firms become larger. We find 
little evidence that small or medium-size firms are, 
on average, more profitable than larger firms when 
profitability is measured with financial statement 
variables. No industries have -,0 or -,- signs and 
only one industry has a -,+ joint signing. 
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Table 4. Summary of number of times explanatory variable coefficients are positive and negative in the 
profitability regressions for 109 industries 
The number of times a coefficient estimate is positive or negative in the set of regressions using the four indicated measures of 
profitability as the dependent variable is reported in each cell. The underlying regression model is:  









The dependent variable is our measure of profitability. EMPL is the log of employment. EMPL2 is the log of employment squared. Y 
is a yearly indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if that year, otherwise 0. TA_RES is the residual from regressing the log of 
EMPL on the log of total assets. S_RES is the residual from regressing the log of EMPL and TA_RES on sales. The numbers in 
parentheses in each cell are the number of times the coefficient was significantly positive or negative at the 0.05 level or less. 
 Dependent profitability variable, Pf,y
 EBITDA Margin EBIT Margin EBITDA/TA EBIT/TA 
Independent






























































Table 5. Profitability functional forms: summary of 
the number of times the coefficients on EMPL and 
EMPL2 have the indicated joint signs 
Each cell for the profitability dependent variable contains the 
number of times the joint signs for EMPL and EMPL2 take on 
the indicated joint values in the respective profitability regres-
sions for the 109 industries. The regression model is: 
? ? ? ?














The dependent variable is our measure of profitability. EMPL is 
the log of employment. EMPL2 is the log of employment 
squared. Y is a yearly indicator variable taking on the value of 1 
if that year, otherwise 0. TA_RES is the residual from regressing 
the log of EMPL on the log of total assets. S_RES is the residual 
from regressing the log of EMPL and TA_RES on sales. A +,- 
means that the regression coefficient on EMPL was signifi-
cantly positive and the regression coefficient on EMPL2 was 
significantly negative at the 0.05 level; 0,0 means that the re-
gression coefficients were not significantly different at the 0.05 
level and so on.  
Joint signs on 
EMPL and 
EMPL2
Dependent profitability variable, Pf,y
EMPL EMPL2 EBITDAMargin
EBIT
Margin EBITDA/TA EBIT/TA 
+ - 41 43 41 42 
0 0 52 52 52 51 
+ 0 9 7 9 11 
0 + 5 1 5 1 
0 - 0 1 0 0 
- + 2 5 2 4 
3.2. Asset and sales residuals. TA_RES is the re-
sidual from regressing log of employees on log of 
assets. A positive TA_RES means that employment 
underestimates assets.  
The connection, if any, between employment under-
estimating assets and firm profitability is problem-
atic. One interpretation is that firms with more as-
sets per employee would be more profitable than 
other firms in the same industry because managers 
have controlled the number of employees needed to 
“work” the assets. Were this the case, profitability 
measures should be higher for those firms with a 
positive TA_RES and the coefficients of TA_RES 
should be positive. 
However, an alternative interpretation is that firms 
with more assets than the average firm have more 
assets than needed or are underutilizing their assets. 
In this case, the coefficients on TA_RES should be 
negative.  
Organizational theories of firm size and profitability 
would predict that the signs on TA_RES in equation 
(5) would be positive. Other things being equal, 
firms with fewer employees would incur fewer or-
ganization costs and, by implication, be more profit-
able, provided that the firms had not over invested 
in assets.  
As it turns out, in Table 4 the signs on asset re-
sidual, TA_RES, are usually positive, especially 
for the profit margin regressions. When EBITDA 
Margin is the dependent variable, the signs on 
TA_RES are positive for 101 out of 109 regres-
sions. They have statistically significant positive 
signs in 77 cases with only one statistically sig-
nificant negative sign. A similar pattern is found 
among the EBIT Margin regressions. Here, 97 out 
of 109 are positive with 68 being significant at the 
0.05 level or lower. 
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More positive than negative coefficients also appear 
on TA_RES for the return on asset profitability 
measures. For EBIT/TA, 72 out of 109 industries 
have positive coefficients with 31 being significant. 
S_RES is the residual from regression log employment 
and TA_RES on the log of sales. The results for S_RES 
ostensibly are inconclusive with respect to the margin 
regressions. For the EBITDA Margin regressions, 20 
are significantly positive, 21 significantly negative and 
23 not significantly different from zero. For the EBIT 
Margin regressions, 27 are significantly positive and 
29 not significantly different from zero. However, the 
results for the EBIT/TA regressions are qualitatively 
different. Here, we observe positive signs on S_RES 
for 56 of the industries and statistically significant 
positive signs for 43 industries. In other words, firms 
with fewer employees per dollar of investment in as-
sets and more sales per employees generate higher 
returns on assets as measured by EBIT to total assets. 
Taken together, the signs on TA_RES in equation (6) 
and the signs on TA_RES and S_RES in equation (5) 
are consistent with the organizational hypotheses 
about firm with regard to the number of employees. 
The fewer the number of employees for a given size 
firm in terms of assets and sales, the more profitable 
the firm is. (We have also used a fixed effects esti-
mator corrected for the unbalanced nature of the 
panel to analyze the data by allowing the intercept 
to vary over each firm within an industry but not 
over time. The results are qualitatively similar to 
those reported above.) 
4. Implications of functional forms for some 
conventional wisdoms 
4.1. Profitability functions and capital intensity. 
Conventional wisdom holds that economies of scale 
are typically associated with substantial investments 
in capital equipment (fixed assets) and high degrees 
of operating leverage (fixed costs). Hence, these 
industries would be expected to be those most likely 
to exhibit profitability at least initially increasing 
with size. Through a certain range, fixed capital 
costs would be spread over more and more units of 
production, thus, leading to increased profitability. 
To examine this possibility, we classify our indus-
tries into seven categories depending on the joint 
signs on EMPL and EMPL2. We then construct four 
measures of capital intensity and test for profitabil-
ity differences among the seven categories with 
regard to our capital intensity measures. 
Our measures of capital intensity are: depreciation to 
sales, capital expenditures to cost of goods sold, capital 
expenditures to sales and depreciation to total assets. 
The mean and median values of these measures for 
each profit function category are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6. Capital intensity of firms in profitability functional form categories 
The profitability functional form categories are based on the EBITDA/TA regressions as reported in Table 8. The top (bottom) 
number in each cell is the mean (median) value for all firm-years in all industries in the indicated profitability category. A plus (+) 
means that the coefficient on EMPL or EMPL2 was significantly positive; a minus (-) means that the coefficient was significantly negative 
and a zero (0) means that the coefficient was not significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. A + ,- superscript next to cell number 
means that its value is significantly greater (less) than the corresponding value for the first (+,-) functional form at the 0.05 level. 
Measure of capital intensity Joint signs on EMPL and 
EMPL2 Depreciation / 
Sales
Capital expenditures / Cost of 
goods sold 




























































All capital intensity measures are significantly 
higher for the economies of scale/organizational 
trade off industries (+,-) than for those industries 
where no relation (0,0) between profits and em-
ployees exists. The third most common profitabil-
ity functional form was constantly increasing 
profits (+,0) with respect to number of employees. 
Again, we would expect industries that were capi-
tal intensive to exhibit increasing profitability 
with respect to size relative to less capital inten-
sive industries.  
Our results are consistent with this expectation. 
Every median measure of capital intensity is higher 
for the group of industries with constantly increas-
ing profits in terms of size than for that group of 
industries exhibiting no relation between size and prof-
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itability. Differences in profitability among firms of 
different size, then, do seem to be due, in part, to 
economies of scale as measured by capital intensity.  
4.2. Concentration, size and profits. The dominant 
theme in the industrial organization literature is that 
profitability is related to market power. Market power 
is usually measured with concentration ratios – a 
common one being the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index 
(HH Index). This Index expresses the square of the 
largest firm’s sales as a percent of the sum of the sales 
squared for every firm in the industry. The ratio takes 
on values from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating 
increasing concentration and decreasing competition. 
Mean and median values for the HH Index are re-
ported by functional form in Table 7. For example, the 
mean HH Index value for all industries where profits 
first increase and then decrease in terms of size (+,-) is 
0.0212 and the median is 0.0155.  
Table 7. Profitability functions and industry 
 concentration 
The profitability functional form categories are based on the 
EBITDA/TA regressions as reported in Table 8. The top (bot-
tom) number in each cell is the mean (median) value for all 
firm-years in all industries in the indicated profitability cate-
gory. A plus (+) means that the coefficient on EMPL or EMPL2 
was significantly positive; a minus (-) means that the coefficient 
was significantly negative and a zero (0) means that the coeffi-
cient was not significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. 
A + ,- superscript next to cell number means that its value is 
significantly greater (less) than the corresponding value for the 
first (+,-) functional form at the 0.05 level. 
Joint signs on EMPL and 




















We might expect that the mean and median HH 
Index would be lesser in those industries where 
profits were an increasing function of size because 
the larger firms would be taking advantage of 
economies of scale and driving out smaller firms. 
Our data support this interpretation; the most com-
petitive industries have an optimal firm size with 
respect to profitability. 
4.3. Profitability, risk and market-to-book ratios. 
In the investment literature, security returns are 
empirically connected to market-to-book ratios and 
firm size where firm size is measured by the com-
pany’s market value. For example, over the years, a 
number of researchers have found that the common 
stocks of small corporations outperformed (had 
higher returns) those of large companies – the small-
stock premium. And, Fama and French (1992) re-
port that a security’s market return is negatively 
related to its market-to-book ratio and that within 
size ranked market-to-book portfolios, small firms 
had higher market returns than large firms. 
The conventional wisdom for these empirical regu-
larities is that size is a proxy for a risk factor(s) not 
captured by the market portfolio or other variables 
in existing asset pricing models. Fama and French 
(1993, 1995), subsequent to their 1992 work, form 
security portfolios based on market-to-book ratios 
and size measured in terms of market value and 
show that these factors outperform the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) in predicting security re-
turns. Fama and French attribute the superior predic-
tive power of size to its ability to capture risk.  
We have shown that accounting based returns are 
either unrelated to size or increase, not decrease, 
with respect to size through a certain range for most 
of our industries. Thus, accounting based measures 
of profitability behave differently with respect to 
size than security returns do.  
But, what about size as measured by employees and 
market-to-book ratios for manufacturing industries? 
Do small firms have smaller market-to-book ratios 
than large firms? 
To investigate this question we estimate the follow-
ing regression for firms in our two most common 
functional form categories: profits at first increasing 
and then decreasing in terms of size (+,-) and profits 




















  (6) 
where MKT/BKf,t = Market value of equity to book 
value of equity, EMPLf,t = log of employment for 
firm f in year t, EMPL2f,t = log of employment 
squared for firm f in year t, and; Yt = an indicator 
variable that takes on the value of 1 for the indi-
cated year. 
In neither case the coefficients on EMPL and 
EMPL2 are statistically significant at the .39 level or 
less. Within our sample of manufacturing firms we 
found no relation between market-to-book ratios and 
size (measured by employees). 
Our size and profitability results are more similar to 
those reported by Berk (1996) than to Fama and 
French (1992). Berk investigated cross sectional 
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relations between firm size and market returns using 
non-market measures of size, including the number of 
employees. Berk concludes that the relation between 
market value and average return is unaffected when 
non-market measures of firm size are used to control 
for the size of the firm. He further concludes that, 
“…when the market value of the firm is controlled for, 
we find evidence of a positive (his italics) relation 
between the non-market size variables and average 
[market] return (Berk, 1996, p. 19). 
4.4. Profitability and diversification. Many financial 
economists and practitioners, based upon a number of 
empirical studies (Villallonga, 2003), believe that di-
versified firms trade at a discount to focused firms and 
that diversified firms are less profitable than their fo-
cused counterparts. These beliefs also have implica-
tions for profitability functions. 
Firms can grow by expanding existing business 
lines or diversifying into (adding on) new areas. 
Now, suppose that expanding existing operations is 
not profitable but the firm still wants to grow. The 
firm could do so by entering new businesses either 
through internal growth or acquisition – what can be 
described as diversification. But, this growth 
through diversification, as noted earlier, may lead to 
a reduction in overall profitability.  
One measure of diversification within a firm is its 
number of business segments. The more business 
segments are, the more diversified the firm is. 
Therefore, we collected data about the number of 
business segments for firms within each of our prof-
itability functional forms and calculated the mean 
and median number of business segments for firms 
within that form. If growth in firm size came 
through diversification, we could observe that firms 
in industries where profits eventually decreased in 
terms of size would have more business segments than 
those in industries where profits constantly increased 
as firms became larger. Our results appear in Table 8. 
Table 8. Profitability functions and diversification 
The profitability functional form categories are based on the 
EBITDA/TA regressions as reported in Table 8. The top (bot-
tom) number in each cell is the mean (median) value for all 
firm-years in all industries in the indicated profitability cate-
gory. A plus (+) means that the coefficient on EMPL or EMPL2 
was significantly positive; a minus (-) means that the coefficient 
was significantly negative and a zero (0) means that the coeffi-
cient was not significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level. 
A + ,- superscript next to cell number means that its value is 
significantly greater (less) than the corresponding value for the 
first (+,-) functional form at the 0.05 level. 
Joint signs on EMPL
and EMPL2 Diversification measure and asset size 
EMPL EMPL2 HerfindahlIndex















































What we find among our three most common func-
tional forms is that those industries with the highest 
mean and median of business segments were those 
with profits eventually decreasing in size (+,-). 
Firms in those industries with constantly increasing 
profitability (+,0) had the lowest mean and median 
of business segments. And firms in the no relation to 
profitability functional form (0,0) had fewer busi-
ness segments than those in declining profitability 
industries but more than in the increasing profitabil-
ity industry.  
With respect to average size of the firm itself, meas-
ured by assets, the largest firms were in the declin-
ing functional form with the most business seg-
ments. The industries with the smallest average size 
firms were those with the fewest business segments 
and in the increasing profitability in size (+,0) func-
tional form.  
Our second measure of diversification is the Her-
findahl Index (H Index). The Herfindahl Index 
measures the percentage of sales of the largest 
business segment of a firm to its total sales. A 
ratio of one means that the firm is a single seg-
ment company; the lower the ratio, the more di-
verse is the firm is. 
Again, among the three most common functional 
forms, the highest value Herfindahl Index is for 
industries with profits continually increasing in 
terms of size (measured by employees). It is the 
lowest for the firms in trade-off function (+,-).  
Our business segment results are similar to those re-
ported by Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) with respect 
to the productivity of plants for conglomerate versus 
single-segment firms. Maksimovic and Phillips find 
that, “plants of conglomerate firms are less productive 
than are plants of single-segment firms of a similar 
size, except for firms of the smallest size” (p. 764). 
Analysis and conclusions 
Our results indicate that the relation between size, 
employees and profitability is industry specific and 
needs to be examined on an industry-by-industry 
basis. Overall, though, the profitability of most 
manufacturing firms as measured by EBITDA Mar-
gin (cash flow margin), EBIT Margin, EBITDA to 
total assets and EBIT to total assets either increases 
at a decreasing rate and then falls or bears no rela-
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tion to size measured by the number of employees. 
The empirical results are consistent with a theory of 
firm size that posits trade-offs between economies 
of scale and organizational costs and with a theory 
that firms possess certain competencies that allow 
them to offset the advantages such as economies of 
scale often attributed to large firms. 
Consistent with the above, we find that for firms of 
a given size as measured by sales and assets, the 
fewer the employees, the more profitable the firm is. 
And, for firms of a given size as measured by the 
number of employees, the fewer the assets, and 
higher the sales, the more profitable the firm is. We 
find virtually no evidence that small manufacturing 
firms are more profitable than larger firms. 
We also find an association between the functional 
form of industry profitability and the number of busi-
ness segments typical of firms within that functional 
form. The mean and median number of business seg-
ments for firms in industries with eventually declining 
profitability in terms of size is greater than for those 
where no relation between profits and size exists or 
where profits constantly increase with respect to size. 
Our overall results have implications for investiga-
tions into the relation between firm size, risk, investor 
required rates of return and whether a firm is earn-
ing its cost of capital. These implications grow out 
of the empirical regularities between firm size, mar-
ket-to-book ratios and market returns on small ver-
sus large companies.  
For example, as noted earlier, Fama and French 
report that stock price returns are related to market-
to-book ratios and to firm size. They find that 
smaller firms have higher returns and lower market-
to-book ratios. Fama and French attribute this em-
pirical regularity to risk.  
If Fama and French are correct about size being a 
proxy for risk, then our results imply that either 
(1) large firms may be earning excess returns or 
(2) small firms may not be earning adequate risk 
adjusted returns. In either case we would expect 
large firms to exhibit larger market-to-book ratios 
than small firms. Yet, we find no evidence that 
market-to-book is related to size in any of our 
functional forms despite the fact that in over 
ninety percent of our industries accounting profit-
ability either increases with size or is unrelated to 
size. We have no explanation for these empirical 
relations but believe it is a puzzle that deserves 
attention. 
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